US Eases Rules for Offensive Counterspace Operations, Wargaming

This week saw significant developments in space-related news. The Department of Defense (DoD) has relaxed restrictions on Space Force and SPACECOM's capability to carry out offensive counterspace operations. These operations predominantly involve electronic warfare (EW)—specifically jamming, which is a form of electronic attack (EA) against other satellites. Recently, there has been substantial discourse regarding EW and electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO). China is prioritizing EW advancements and progressing rapidly, potentially outpacing the United States.

Other offensive counterspace activities include direct ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) operations, such as targeting a satellite with a missile. While this capability exists, it is unlikely that the authority to execute such actions will be delegated during competitive scenarios due to the complexities and evident attribution involved. DA-ASAT contributes to the increasing problem of space debris. Similarly, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), where a spacecraft maneuvers near another and interacts with it, pose significant challenges. An example includes using a satellite to deploy a grenade or disrupting another satellite by collision. Like DA-ASAT, RPO lacks plausible deniability and may lead to cascading impacts. Hence, these operations are anticipated to be reserved for critical circumstances.

Another counterspace strategy involves cyberattacks to seize control of spacecraft. This method is viewed as highly escalatory and thus considered improbable. Various other capabilities exist; however, it is assessed that the most probable form of offensive counterspace operations will involve relatively straightforward EA—jamming the links of suspected spy satellites positioned to gather intelligence on U.S. assets.

Additionally, the Golden Dome has emerged as a topic of interest, with arguments over spectrum sharing between military and commercial sectors. The rising support for Golden Dome includes Senators forming a Caucus to advocate for its agenda. Senator Tim Sheehy (R-MT) has provided the first feasible government estimate, suggesting it might cost 'trillions of dollars'. Prior analysis estimated $1.7 trillion for ground-based mid-course interceptors alone. Incorporating space-based boost-phase interceptors, extensive C5ISR requirements, and additional components will likely increase this figure. Ensuring controlled and effective expenditure will be critical going forward.